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Burns: Burns: Stipulation Cannot Make Polygraph Results Admissible

STIPULATION CANNOT MAKE
POLYGRAPH RESULTS ADMISSIBLE
State v. Biddle'
The defendant, Thomas Biddle, was arrested and charged with robbing
an Otterville, Missouri liquor store. 2 Before trial, the defendant submitted
to a polygraph examination 3 and, pursuant to a stipulation, agreed to the
admission of the polygraph results at trial. 4 The polygraph examiner testified
that the defendant's responses to questions about the robbery indicated
deception. The trial court denied Biddle's motion to suppress the polygraph
evidence, and he was convicted of first degree robbery. 5
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District reversed, finding that the polygraph evidence was inadmissible; consequently, the evidence
was insufficient to sustain a conviction. 6 The case was transferred to the
Missouri Supreme Court on certification by a dissenting judge that the decision was contrary to existing authority. 7 The supreme court upheld the court
of appeals 8 and absolutely prohibited the admission of polygraph examination results. 9

1. 599 S.W.2d 182 (Mo. En Banc 1980).
2. Id. at 184.
3. The polygraph is a pneumatically operated machine that records changes
in blood pressure, pulse, and respiration, supplemented with a unit for recording
galvanic skin reflexes. The theory behind polygraphy is that a subject's attempt
to deceive will result in measurable, involuntary physiological changes that will be
recorded by the polygraph and interpreted by the examiner. J. REID & F. INBAU,
TRUTH AND DECEPTION 4 (1966).
An extensive discussion of the polygraph technique is beyond this casenote.
See generally id.; Abrams, Polygraphy Today, 3 NAT'LJ. CRIM. DEF. 85 (1977); Axelrod, The Use of Lie Detectorsby CriminalDefense Attorneys, 3 NAT'LJ. CRIM. DEF. 107
(1977); Skolnick, Scientific Theory andScientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie Detection,
70 YALE L.J. 694 (1961).
4. The stipulation provided that either party would be permitted to introduce
the results of the polygraph examination in evidence. 599 S.W.2d at 185.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. One of the court of appeals judges dissented and certified for the purpose
of transfer to the supreme court that the court of appeals opinion was in conflict
with State v. Fields, 434 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. 1968), regarding the admissibility of
polygraph examination results and the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction. 599 S.W.2d at 184-85.
8. 599 S.W.2d at 195.
9. Id. at 191.
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The supreme court first considered the admissibility of polygraph examination results in State v. Cole.10 Cole contended that the trial court erred
in excluding expert testimony about the effectiveness of the polygraph and
in refusing appellant's request to be subjected to the lie detector test.11 Relying
on the general scientific acceptance test first enunciated in Flye v. United
States,1 2 the court held that the lie detector technique had not received the
requisite "wide scientific approval" necessary for the results to be admissible in evidence. 13 After Cole, Missouri courts routinely held results of lie detectqr examinations to be inadmissible.1 4

10. 354 Mo. 181, 188 S.W.2d 43 (1945). Cole was charged with first degree
murder. At trial Cole denied his guilt and testified that the police coerced his written confession with beatings. The trial court convicted Cole of first degree murder
and imposed the death penalty. Id. at 183-88, 188 S.W.2d at 45-48.
11. Id. at 192, 188 S.W.2d at 50. Cole also assigned as error the trial court's
overruling of his motion that all witnesses be subjected to lie detector tests. Id. at
191, 188 S.W.2d at 50. The supreme court held that witnesses could not be subjected to such "inquisitorial and deceptive tests without their consent," and observed that the use of the lie detector machine before the jury would serve only to
"distract them and impede the trial." Id. at 193, 188 S.W.2d at 51.
12. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In Fiye, the trial court excluded the
testimony of a scientist who conducted a systolic blood pressure deception test, the
forerunner of today's polygraph, on the defendant and refused the defendant's offer to have the scientist conduct the test in the presence of the jury. The jury convicted Frye of second degree murder. The appellate court sustained the actions of
the trial court and set forth the test that has been the basis for the exclusion of the
results of polygraph examinations in evidence for over half a century:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere
in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized,
and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
We think the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet gained
such standing and scientific recognition amongphysiologicalandpsychological
authoritiesas would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced
from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far made.
Id. at 1014 (emphasis added).
13. 354 Mo. at 193, 188 S.W.2d at 51. In overruling defendant's assignments
of error, the court actually gave two reasons: "[s]uch tests should not be made before
the jury during the trial... and appellant's offer of proof did not show that method
of detecting guilt had sufficient scientific support." Id. at 193, 188 S.W.2d at 51.
The court admitted that the lie detector "may point to evidence which is competent," but found that "it has no place in the courtroom." Id. at 193, 188 S.W.2d
at 51.
14. See, e.g., State v. Weindorf, 361 S.W.2d 806, 811 (Mo. 1962); State v.
Stidham, 305 S.W.2d 7, 8 (Mo. 1957).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/11
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A later supreme court decision, however, weakened the prohibition on
polygraph evidence. In State v. Fields,1 5 the defendant waived any objection
16
to the prosecution's evidential use of the polygraph examination results.
The defendant appealed, arguing that the admission of such evidence violated
his constitutional rights.1 7 The Fieldscourt expressly declined to rule on the
admissibility of polygraph evidence in regard to its scientific reliability.' 8
The court noted that a defendant may waive his constitutional rights if the
waiver is intelligent and voluntary. 19 The court ended its analysis of Fields'
polygraph stipulation by stating, "[N]one of defendant's constitutional rights
or privileges were infringed, underthese circumstances, by the admission of this
evidence. The weight of the evidence was solely for the jury, in the light of
a most extensive cross-examination." 20 Relying on these two sentences in
Fields, subsequent appellate decisions held the results of polygraph examina22
tions to be admissible 21 if there had been a prior stipulation.
The Biddle court's holding subjects all polygraph evidence to complete
exclusion. 23 The court rejected the popular interpretation that Fields provided for the admission of stipulated polygraph evidence and held that Fields
15. 434 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. 1968). In Fields, the defendant, charged with armed
robbery, pleaded not guilty and requested that he be given a lie detector test. Id.
at 509-10.
16. The defendant, his counsel, and the prosecutor executed a stipulation that
was filed and approved by the court. The stipulation provided that the defendant
waived "absolutely and irrevocably each and every objection to the use in evidence
by the prosecution of the results of said test." In the stipulation the defendant
specifically agreed that the examiner should be permitted to testify without objection about the test and its results, including whether defendant's answers were
truthful or not. Id. at 511.
17. Id. at 512. The defendant contended that the admission of the polygraph
evidence violated his rights under U.S. CONST. amend. IV, V & XIV and Mo.
CONST. art. 1, §§ 10 & 19.
18. 434 S.W.2d at 513.
19. Id. at 515.
20. Id. (emphasis added). The holding in Fields was meant to be very narrow,
applying only to the circumstances of this particular case. See 599 S.W.2d at 186.
For a more detailed analysis of Fields, see JudicialAcceptance of Results of Scientiic
Evidence-The Paraffin Test and the Polygraph, 34 MO. L. REV. 592 (1969).
21. See, e.g., State v. Hughes, 594 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980);
State v. Stowers, 580 S.W.2d 516, 518 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979); State v. Scott, 570
S.W.2d 813, 815 (Mo. App., K.C. 1978).
22. See State v. Scott, 570 S.W.2d 813, 813 (Mo. App., K.C. 1978) ("[T]he
written stipulation entered into between the parties gave the polygraph examination administered to defendant a legal aura of reliability thereby infusing the conclusive results obtained with probative value."); State v. Mick, 546 S.W.2d 508,
509 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976) ("However anomalous it may be, the parties, by
stipulation, may waive objections to the admission of polygraph examinations and
their results, and in that sense imbue them with reliability and probative value.").
23. 599 S.W.2d at 191.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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had been misread. 24 Although recognizing the various approaches taken by
courts in other jurisdictions, 25 the court chose the most restrictive stance on
polygraph evidence. The court's primary reasons for holding polygraph examination results inadmissible in evidence were the polygraph's lack of
reliability 26 and the concern that polygraph evidence invades the province

of the jury.

27

The court began its analysis by agreeing that evidence lacking scientific
28
reliability cannot be made admissible by stipulation. Starting from this
premise, the court addressed the issue left unanswered by the Fields decision: the scientific reliability of the polygraph examination. 29 The Biddle court
found that since Cole, the advances in polygraph technology have not made
polygraph examination results sufficiently reliable for admission in
31
evidence.3 0 In support of this conclusion, the court quoted People v. Monigan,

24. Id. at 186. The court reaffirmed Fields, "limiting that decision to the issue
regarding a voluntary and intelligent waiver of a constitutional right against selfincrimination." Id.
25. See notes 57-63 and accompanying text infra.
26. 599 S.W.2d at 191.
27. Id. These are basically the same two reasons the court relied on to exclude
the polygraph evidence in State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181, 193, 188 S.W.2d 43, 51
(1945). See note 13 supra.
28. 599 S.W.2d at 188. The court also pointed out that parties cannot make
evidence admissible by written stipulation. Id. (citing State v. Frazier, 252 S.E. 2d
39, 46 (W. Va. 1979), cited with approval in People v. Monigan, 72 InI. App. 3d 87,
93, 390 N.E.2d 562, 566 (1979)). See also Stine v. Kansas City, 458 S.W.2d 601,
606 (Mo. App., K.C. 1970).
The view that otherwise inadmissible evidence may be rendered admissible by
a stipulation has been criticized as logically unsound. See The Role of the Polygraph
in Criminal Trialsunder MassachusettsLaw and the FederalRules ofEvidence, 15 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 837, 841 (1980). The theory usually advanced for allowing admission of
stipulated polygraph evidence is based on estoppel. Id. See also note 59 and accompanying text infra.

29. 599 S.W.2d at 185-86.
30. Critics of the polygraph technique contend that polygraph evidence should
never be introduced in the courtroom. Skolnick, supranote 3, at 727. ContraTarlow,
Admissibility of PolygraphEvidence in 1975: An Aid in DeterminingCredibilityin a PerjuryPlaguedSystem, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 917, 920 (1975); CriminalProcedure-Polygraph
Evidence-ImpeachmentofPolygraphExaminer Testimony by Defense ExpertsAllowedatAdmissibility Hearing, 63 MARQ. L. REV. 143, 158 (1979).
31. 72 I. App. 3d 87, 390 N.E.2d 562 (1979). InMonigan, the court reversed
a murder conviction, holding that polygraph results are inadmissible in evidence
notwithstanding a written stipulation. Id. at 100, 390 N.E.2d at 571. The court
found that the polygraph technique had not yet met the Fye test of general scientific acceptance and held that mere stipulation between the parties did nothing to
enhance such "unreliable and untrustworthy evidence." Id. For cases culminating
in the prohibition of polygraph evidence in Illinois, see People v. Triplett, 37 Ill.
2d 234, 238, 226 N.E.2d 30, 32 (1967); People v. Nimmer, 25 Ill. 2d 319, 320, 185
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/11
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an Illinois appellate decision, and State v. Frazier,32 a West Virginia Supreme
Court decision, to the effect that polygraph examination results are not
suitable for admission in evidence.3 3 In both Monigan and Frazier,the prosecution was allowed to introduce the results of the defendants' polygraph ex34
aminations conducted pursuant to stipulations similar to the one in Biddle.
The appellate courts reversed, reasoning that polygraph examination results
are inadmissible because they lack scientific reliability. 35 The Biddle court
observed that the range of error for a given polygraph examination is
estimated to be from five to thirty percent3 6 and that a polygraph examinaerroneous results37 regardless of an examiner's
tion may produce
38
qualifications.

N.E.2d 249,250 (1962); People v. Ferguson, 84 Ill. App. 3d 175, 180,405 N.E.2d
21, 25 (1980); People v. Ackerman, 132 Ill. App. 2d 251, 253, 269 N.E.2d 737,

739 (1971).
32. 252 S.E.2d 39 (W. Va. 1979). Frazieris apparently a case of first impression in West Virginia. Frazier was convicted of delivering marijuana. Prior to trial,
he submitted to a polygraph examination, pursuant to a written stipulation signed
by him, his counsel, and the prosecutor. Id. at 43. The polygraph examiner testified
that the defendant's denial of delivering the marijuana was a lie, and the trial court
admitted the examiner's testimony over defendant's objection. The West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, holding that polygraph examination results
are not admissible in evidence in a criminal trial. Id. at 49.
33. 599 S.W.2d at 189 (quoting Frazier and Monigan).
34. See notes 31 & 32 supra.
35. People v. Monigan, 72 Ill. App. 3d 87,100, 390 N.E.2d 562, 571 (1979);
State v. Frazier, 252 S.E.2d 39, 49 (W. Va. 1979).
36. 599 S.W.2d at 189-90. See also Abbell, PolygraphEvidence: The Case Against
Admissibility in FederalCriminalTrials, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 29,35 (1977); Radek,
The Admissibility ofPolygraph Results in Criminal Trials:A Casefor the Status Quo, 3 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 289, 297 (1972); Comment, The CourtroomStatus of the Polygraph, 14
AKRON L. REV. 133,137 (1980). On the other hand, leading polygraph proponents
contend that studies show the polygraph technique reaches correct results more than
95% of the time. J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 3, at 234; Horvath & Reid, The
Reliability of Polygraph Examiner Diagnosis of Truth and Deception, 62 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY &POLICE Sci. 276,278 (1971); Note, The Emergence ofthe Polygraph
at Trial, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1120, 1124 (1973). Critics, however, find the accuracy
figures compiled by Reid and Inbau to be unsatisfactory because of the lack of an
independent means to check the phenomenon of lying. Skolnick, supranote 3, at 699.
37. Erroneous results may be produced because the autonomic responses to
relevant questions are influenced by individual difference variables that are not a
function of the subject's guilt or innocence, e.g., the effect of mental abberration
or instability of the subject, the effect of the subject's taking depressant drugs, and
the effect of the subject's physical health. Comment, supra note 36, at 36. See also
Abbell, supra note 36, at 49.
38. 599 S.W.2d at 190. Proponents contend that most of the polygraph's problems can be solved, or at least minimized, by having the polygraph examination
conducted by a properly trained examiner. It also has been acknowledged that
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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The Biddle court stated that polygraph examination reliability also is affected detrimentally by its inherent inability to detect honest misstatements
of fact 39 or the pathological liar. 40 Because of these inadequacies, the court
feared that at least two unacceptable situations might occur if polygraph
results were admitted:
[A] guilty party who recognizes no responsibility to tell the truth
might "beat the machine" and offer the erroneous results as proof
ofinnocence.... [A]n innocent party might submit to a polygraph
examination with the hope of proving his innocence and obviating
results constitute the
the rigors of a trial, only to find that erroneous
41
heart of the state's case against him.
Because of the possibility of erroneous polygraph findings and the resulting
potential for injustice, the court saw no alternative but absolute exclusion
42
of polygraph evidence.

judicial acceptance of the polygraph test will not be complete until there is a substantial improvement in the level of examiner competence. Even proponents of the
polygraph admit that there are few adequately trained polygraph examiners. J.
REID & F. INBAU, supranote 3, at 234; Comment, supra note 36, at 135; Note, supra
note 36, at 1124; Note, The Polygraphic Technique, A Selective Analysis, 20 DRAKE L.
REV. 330, 352 (1971).
Some states require that polygraph examiners be licensed to practice and require varying degrees of experience and training. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 71-2206
(1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-5005 (1979); KY. REV. STAT. § 329.030 (Cum. Supp.
1980); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 338.1708 (1976); MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-29-11
(Cum. Supp. 1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 648A-100 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
61-26-4 (Pamphlet 1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-31-07 (Supp. 1981); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1457 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
39. 599 S.W.2d at 190. A polygraph examination measures the conscious conflict between the answer given to the examiner and the facts as believed by the accused. Essentially, the polygraph "discloses whether the subject believes what he
is saying." Skolnick, supra note 3, at 725.
40. 599 S.W.2d at 190. Because concern over possible detection is the principal factor accounting for physiological changes recorded by the polygraph, the
person who lies, but has no compunction about lying, is unlikely to be detected.
J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 3, at 50; Abbell, supra note 36, at 33.
41. 599 S.W.2d at 191. Polygraph studies have shown that polygraph examiners' errors generally favor the guilty subject; the erroneous examiner is more
likely to find a guilty subject innocent than to find an innocent subject guilty. Abbell, supra note 36, at 35; Horvath & Reid, supra note 36, at 278.
The polygraph examination is used extensively in other areas, as well as by the
prosecutor in deciding whether to charge an individual. See Note, supra note 38,
at 343-47. An indirect result of the Biddle decision might be an unwillingness on

the part of the prosecutor to agree to drop charges against an accused person who
passes a polygraph test. Because polygraph evidence is inadmissible at trial, the
incentive to make such an agreement is reduced.
42. 599 S.W.2d at 191. In Biddle, the defendant gave a truthful answer to the
question, "Do you live in the United States?", but the polygraph indicated decephttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/11
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Although the Biddle court reached its conclusion without citing Frye, it
applied the Frye test of general scientific acceptance 43 to determine the admissibility of polygraph results. Under the Frye test, the court assumes that
polygraph evidence must be excluded, regardless of probative value, unless
the polygraph technique is shown to have received general scientific
acceptance. 4 To meet the strict requirement of general scientific acceptance,
the polygraph must be accepted not only by polygraphy experts but also by
physiology and psychology experts.4 5 In finding that the polygraph had not
received wide scientific approval, the Biddle court did not expressly require
the polygraph to receive approval from scientific experts other than
polygraphy experts. Nevertheless, the court's reliance on Frazierand Monigan,
4 6
both of which used the Frye test, impliedly requires such broad approval.
It has been suggested that the most important consideration against the
admissibility of polygraph evidence is not reliability but its potential for confusing and misleading the jury.4 7 The Biddle court was extremely concerned
48
about the impact of polygraph examination results not only on the jury
but on the jury system. 4 9 The court felt the jury would tend to consider the
tion. The court found this error to be indicative of the polygraph's unreliability.
Id. at 190.
43. Id. at 191. The Frye test of general scientific acceptance has been much
criticized. Many critics point out that the general standard enunciated in Frye is
a proper test for taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for the
admissibility of scientific evidence. A failure to meet the Frye test of general scientific acceptance should merely preclude admissibility as a fact judicially noticed;
it should not preclude admission entirely. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 203 (2d ed. 1972). See alsoKaplan, TheLieDetector:AnAnalysis
of its Place in the Law of Evidence, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 381, 386 (1964); Tarlow, supra
note 30, at 938 n. 107; Comment, supranote 36, at 138; Comment, Compulsory Process and Polygraph Evidence: Does Exclusion Violate a CriminalDefendant's Due Process
Rights?, 12 CONN. L. REV. 324, 339 (1980). Other commentators criticize the Frye
test as either outdated or too stringent when compared with the admission standards for other scientific evidence. See Abbell, supra note 36, at 32; Note, supra note
36, at 1139.
It has been suggested that polygraph evidence should be treated like other types
of scientific evidence, where the only requirement is that the evidence be an aid
to the jury or be reliable enough to be probative. Kadish, The Polygraph, Hypnosis,
Truth Drugs and the PsychologicalStress Evaluator:Admissibility in a CriminalTrial, 4 AM.
J. TRIAL ADVOC. 593, 595 (1981). ContraUnited States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161,
167 (8th Cir. 1975); Skolnick, supra note 3, at 695.
44. Kaplan, supra note 43, at 394. See also Note, supra note 38, at 336.
45. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
46. People v. Monigan, 72 Ill. App. 3d 87, 95-96, 390 N.E.2d 562, 567-68
(1979); State v. Frazier, 252 S.E.2d 39, 43-45 (W. Va. 1979).
47. 15 NEW ENG. L. REV., supra note 28, at 850. See also Abbell, supra note 36,
at 62; 63 MARQ. L. REV., supra note 30, at 158.
48. 599 S.W.2d at 191.
49. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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polygraph evidence unimpeachable.5 0 As a result, the polygraph would usurp
the jury's traditional function, thus depriving the defendant "of the common sense and judgment of his peers.' '51 This is a common fear and may
be the nemesis of the courtroom use of polygraph results. 52 If the underlyin reason for opposition to the polygraph is that the machine would invade
the traditional and constitutional province of the jury,5 3 admissibility of
54
polygraph evidence c.nnot be gained merely by increasing its reliability.
The more reliable the polygraph becomes, the more persuasive is the argument to admit polygraph evidence because of probative value. But as the
polygraph becomes more reliable, there is a greater likelihood of it displacing the role of the jury.
As if in anticipation of the day when polygraph evidence is deemed to
have general scientific acceptance, the Biddle court suggested anotherjustification for the inadmissibility of polygraph examination results. The court found
that exclusion of polygraph results conforms with Missouri law that opinion
testimony of expert witnesses should not be admitted when the jurors are
competent to reach correct conclusions from the facts presented. 55 The court
believed that the jury is capable of performing this function and concluded
emphatically that "[t]here is no place in our jury system for a machine or
an expert to tell the jury who is lying and who is not." 5 6 Perhaps recognizing the logical dilemma that will arise once the polygraph is deemed reliable,
the Biddle court seemingly created a reserve argument against admissibility.
By deciding that polygraph test results are inadmissible, with or without
57
a stipulation, Missouri aligned itself with a majority of the other states.
50. Id. It has been suggested that limiting instructions could be used to inform the jury of the polygraph's proper role and thus avoid any displacement or
misleading of thejury. See United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685, 691 (D.D.C.),
rev'dpercuriam, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Comment, supra note 36, at 146.
But see Confessions, Habeas Corpus andthe Stein Case, 8 STAN. L. REV. 451,456 (1956);
15 NEW ENG. L. REV., supra note 28, at 850.
51. 599 S.W.2d at 191. See also Abbell, supra note 36, at 53.
52. SeeUnited States v. Stromberg, 179 F. Supp. 278, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
53. See Tarlow, supra note 30, at 938 n.107.
54. See Kaplan, supra note 43, at 413.
55. 599 S.W.2d at 191. See also Sampson v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 560 S.W.2d
573, 586 (Mo. 1978).
56. 599 S.W.2d at 191.
57. See Pulakis v. State, 476 P.2d 474, 479 (Alaska 1970); People v. Monigan,
72 Ill.
App. 3d 87, 100, 390 N.E.2d 562, 571 (1979); Conley v. Commonwealth,
382 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Ky. 1964); State v. Corbin, 285 So. 2d 234, 239 (La. 1973);
Akonom v. State, 40 Md. App. 676, 686, 394 A.2d 1213, 1219 (1978); People v.
Liddell, 63 Mich. App. 491, 495, 234 N.W.2d 669, 672 (1975); Jordan v. State,
365 So. 2d 1198, 1204 (Miss. 1978); State v. McClean, 587 P.2d 20, 22 (Mont.
1978); State v. LaForest, 106 N.H. 159, 161, 207 A.2d 429, 431 (1964); Fulton
v. State, 541 P.2d 871, 872 (Okla. Grim. App. 1975); Romero v. State, 493 S.W.2d
206, 213 (Tex. Grim. App. 1973); State v. Frazier, 252 S.E.2d 39, 49 (W. Va.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/11
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There is, however, a definite trend in both state and federal courts toward
5
admitting polygraph results.
Several states permit the results of polygraph tests to be admitted in
59
evidence if there is a prior stipulation and certain qualifications are met.
In adopting the restrictive position regarding the admissibility of polygraph
test results, Missouri expressly rejected this approach. 60 Some states allow
unstipulated polygraph results to be admitted in evidence for limited purposes at the discretion of the trial judge. 61 Other states simply decline to follow
the Frye test of admissibility and find polygraph results admissible on the
63
62
basis that such results are relevant and reliable.
Several federal courts have recognized that polygraph evidence may be
1979); State v. Dean, 103 Wis. 2d 228, 279, 307 N.W.2d 628, 653 (1981). For a
more complete discussion of states' policies on the admissibility of polygraph
evidence, see 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 999

(1970 & Supp. 1981); Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 1005 (1973 & Supp. 1981).
58. See Tarlow, supra note 30, at 947.
59. State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962), is the leading case
on stipulations for the admissibility of polygraph evidence. In Valdez, the Arizona
Supreme Court held that stipulated polygraph evidence is admissible for purposes
of corroboration and impeachment under certain conditions. Id. at 283-84, 371 P.2d
at 900-01. Several states follow the Valdez approach. See Williams v. State, 378 A.2d
117, 120 (Del. 1977); Owens v. State, 176 Ind. App. 1, 3,373 N.E.2d 913, 914-15
(1978); Commonwealth v. Allen, 377 Mass. 674, 677, 387 N.E.2d 553, 555 (1979);
Corbett v. State, 584 P.2d 704, 707 (Nev. 1978); State v. McDavitt, 62 N.J. 36,
46, 297 A.2d 849, 855 (1972); State v. Milano, 297 N.C. 485, 499, 256 S.E.2d 154,
162 (1979); State v. Souel, 53 Ohio St. 2d 123, 132, 372 N.E.2d 1318, 1323 (1978);
State v. Ross, 7 Wash. App. 62, 69, 497 P.2d 1343, 1347 (1972); Cullin v. State,
565 P.2d 445, 457 (Wyo. 1977). For a complete discussion concerning the states
that admit stipulated polygraph evidence, see 3AJ. WIGMORE, supranote 57, § 999;
Annot., supra note 57.
60. 599 S.W.2d at 188. See also note 28 supra.
61. See State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975, 983 (La. 1979) (polygraph evidence
admissible at discretion of trial judge in post-trial proceeding); People v. Barbara,
400 Mich. 352, 412, 255 N.W.2d 171, 197 (1974) (same). See generallyUnited States
v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 96 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Note, supra note 36, at 1142.
62. State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M. 184, 185, 539 P.2d 204, 205 (1975) (court stated
that polygraph evidence is admissible when it satisfies normal requirements of
relevancy under the state rules of evidence, which are patterned on the Federal Rules
of Evidence). The court applied the state's counterpart to FED. R. EVID. 401 & 402
in conjunction with the state's counterpart to FED. R. EVID. 702 & 703. 88 N.M.
at 185, 539 P.2d at 205. Admissibility based on relevance is an easier standard to
meet than the Frye general acceptance text. To be relevant, there must be some acceptance in the scientific community, but not the more extensive general acceptance of Fye. 15 NEW ENG. L. REV., supra note 28, at 844.
63. Walther v. O'Connell, 72 Misc. 2d 316, 318, 339 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387
(Queens County Civ. Ct. 1972); In re Stenzel, 71 Misc. 2d 719, 723, 336 N.Y.S.2d
839, 844 (Fain. Ct. 1972).
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admitted on a case-by-case basis if a proper foundation has been established.64
In United States v. Ridling, 65 the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan conducted a review of the polygraph's utility in the
courtroom 65 and held that unstipulated polygraph evidence is admissible in
a perjury trial. 67 The court found that the underlying theory of the polygraph
technique was sound and that the polygraph evidence was relevant. 68 The
court denounced, as lacking merit, the argument that the polygraph will over69
whelm the jury or endanger the jury's status.
In UnitedStates v. Alexander, 70 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit declined to adopt the rationale of Ridling to the extent of permitting the admission of unstipulated polygraph evidence. 71 Other eighth
circuit court of appeals decisions, however, indicated an inclination to leave
the admissibility of polygraph evidence to the trial judge's discretion, at least
when there is a prior stipulation, rather than applying a per se rule of
72
exclusion.
64. See, e.g., United States v. Flores, 540 F.2d 432, 436-37 (9th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Wainwright, 413 F.2d 796, 803 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1009 (1970). See also Tarlow, supra note 30, at 947.
65. 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972). Other federal district courts have
favorably reviewed the polygraph technique. See, e.g., United States v. Zeiger, 350
F. Supp. 685, 687 (D.D.C.), rev'dpercuriam,475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United
States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377, 1380 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd, 470 F.2d 1367
(9th Cir. 1972), cert. dened, 412 U.S. 90 (1973); United States v. Hart, 344 F. Supp.
522, 524 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
66. 350 F. Supp. at 92-95.
67. Id. at 99. The court held that evidence of polygraph experts pertaining
to the polygraph examination of the defendant and their opinions were to be admitted subject to certain conditions. Id.
68. Id. at 95. The court stressed that a perjury case is ideal for the admission
of polygraph evidence because the polygraph is particularly useful in detecting
whether a person acted willfully or knowingly. Id. at 98.
69. Id. at 98.
70. 526 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975).
71. Id. at 167.
72. SeeUnited States v. Smith, 552 F.2d 257, 260 n.3 (8th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 731, 736 (8th Cir. 1975).
Four circuits of the federal courts of appeals have given discretion to the trial
judge to admit polygraph evidence. See United States v. Fife, 573 F.2d 369, 373
(6th Cir. 1976), cert. dened, 430 U.S. 933 (1977); United States v. Bursten, 560 F.2d
779, 785 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Smith, 552 F.2d 257, 260 n.3 (8th Cir.
1977); United States v. Flores, 540 F.2d 432, 436-37 (9th Cir. 1976). Three circuits of the federal courts of appeals follow a per se rule of exclusion in relation to
polygraph evidence. See United States v. Fay, 284 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 850 (1961); United States v. Clark, 598 F.2d 994, 995 (5th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1128 (1981); United States v. Skeens, 494 F.2d
1050, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit indicated that polygraph evidence could be admitted if a proper foundahttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/11
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Missouri's absolute prohibition against admissions of polygraph
evidence, notwithstanding a prior stipulation 73 and regardless of who attempts to introduce the evidence, 74 may violate the defendant's right to a
fair trial. In Washington v. Texas75 and Chambers v. Mississippi,76 the United
States Supreme Court held that the compulsory process clause of the sixth
amendment" entitles a criminal defendant to call witnesses and have the
testimony of those witnesses heard at trial, despite contrary state rules of
evidence. 78 In both decisions, the Court found that if courts apply state rules
of evidence arbitrarily and mechanistically to prohibit the defendant from
79
calling witnesses, the defendant's compulsory process rights are infringed.
tion was presented. See United States v. Russo, 527 F.2d 1051, 1058-59(10thCir.
1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906 (1976); United States v. Wainwright, 413 F.2d 796,
803 (10th Cir. 1969) (dictum), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970).
For a more detailed analysis of the federal courts' treatment of polygraph
evidence, see Abbell, supra note 36, at 39-43; Note, supranote 36, at 1129-34; Annot., 43 A.L.R. Fed. 68 (1979 & Supp. 1981).
73. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
74. In at least two cases since Biddle, Missouri appellate courts relied on Biddle to exclude polygraph evidence tendered by defendants. See State v. Lieberknecht,
608 S.W.2d 93, 101 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980); State v. Shives, 601 S.W.2d 22, 27
(Mo. App., W.D. 1980).
75.
76.
77.

388 U.S. 14 (1967).
410 U.S. 284 (1973).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides, in part, "In all criminal prosecutions,

the accused shall enjoy the right.., to have compulsory process for obtaining
Witnesses in his favor .... " The sixth amendment applies to the states by incorporation in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-18 (1967).

78. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302-03 (1973); Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967).
79. In Washington, the defendant was charged with murder. At his trial he
sought to have his co-participant in the shooting testify on his behalf. On the basis
of two Texas statutes preventing a participant accused of a crime from testifying
for his co-participant, the trial court refused to allow the co-participant's testimony,
and the defendant was convicted. The United States Supreme Court held that the
state had arbitrarily denied the defendant the right to present testimony material
to his defense; thus, his right to compulsory process was infringed. 388 U.S. at 22-23.
In Chambers, the defendant was charged with the murder of a policeman. At trial,
Chambers was prevented from cross-examining a witness because he had called
the witness, and under Mississippi's voucher rule, a party may not impeach his
own witness. Also, Chambers was not allowed to introduce the testimony of three
persons to whom the witness had confessed because the trial court ruled their
testimony inadmissible as hearsay. Chambers was convicted of the murder. The
Supreme Court stated that "where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically
to defeat the ends ofjustice." 410 U.S. at 302. The Court held that the exclusion
of evidence critical to the defendant, coupled with the state's refusal to permit
Chambers to cross-examine the witness, deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Id.
at 302-03.
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The doctrine of Washington and Chambers has seldom been invoked in
relation to the admissibility of polygraph evidence offered by a defendant. 80
The chances of application of the doctrine to Missouri decisions, however,
seems to be increased by Biddle because its absolute rule of exclusion admits
of no exceptions nor provides for any judicial discretion, increasing the
likelihood the rule will be considered arbitrary or mechanistic. Under
Washington and Chambers, unless the Missouri courts can establish that an
absolute prohibition against the admission of polygraph evidence is necessary
for the protection of a legitimate state interest, the Biddle rule of complete
exclusion could be held to impair a defendant's constitutional right to compulsory process.

81

Biddle held the results of polygraph examinations to be absolutely prohibited as evidence in Missouri courts. 82 The reasons given for the exclusion of polygraph evidence were that the evidence is unreliable and that admission of the evidence invades the province of the jury. The results of
polygraph tests, however, do not merit a rule of complete exclusion merely
because of a degree of unreliability. The reliability of polygraph results is
comparable to other scientific evidence that is admissible. Additionally, the
court's concern that a machine will displace the jury does not warrant the
restrictive approach taken. If treated like other scientific evidence, the
polygraph examination results will merely aid the jury to reach their own
conclusions about the truth. Finally, the court's holding overlooked the
possibility that an absolute prohibition of polygraph evidence may impair
the defendant's right to present evidence favorable to his defense. In its
endeavor to exclude unreliable evidence and protect the province of the jury,
the Biddle court may have jeopardized defendants' constitutional right to
a fair trial.
DEANNA A. BURNS

80. See State v. Dorsey, 87 N.M. 323, 325-26, 532 P.2d 912, 914-15 (Ct. App.
1975) (defendant denied compulsory process when polygraph evidence excluded);
State v. Levert, 58 Ohio St. 2d 213, 215, 389 N.E.2d 848, 850 (1979) (exclusion

of polygraph expert's testimony on defendant's behalf did not violate compulsory
process clause); State v. Sims, 52 Ohio Misc. 31, 42, 369 N.E.2d 24, 46 (C.P.
Cuyahoga County 1977) (defendant denied compulsory process when his request
for polygraph examination denied).
81. Note, Admission of PolygraphResults: A Due ProcessPerspective, 55 IND. L.J.
157, 188 (1979). See also Comment, supra note 43, at 351.
82. The rule in Biddle is prospective in application. State v. Walker, 616
S.W.2d 48, 49 (Mo. En Banc 1981). There is a possibility that even under
Missouri's rule of absolute prohibition, polygraph evidence may be admissible to

prove the voluntariness of a confession made after, during, or in anticipation of
a polygraph examination. See United States v. McDevitt, 328 F.2d 282, 284 (6th
Cir. 1964); Tyler v. United States, 193 F.2d 24, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 908 (1952); J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 3, at 252-54.
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